{"id":2930,"date":"2018-04-05T14:07:30","date_gmt":"2018-04-05T14:07:30","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/iraniancongress.com\/nic\/?page_id=2930"},"modified":"2024-07-14T22:31:32","modified_gmt":"2024-07-14T22:31:32","slug":"iran-politics-human-rights","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/iraniancongress.com\/nic\/iran-politics-human-rights","title":{"rendered":"Iran: Politics, Human Rights, and U.S. Policy"},"content":{"rendered":"

[vc_row content_placement=”top” css_animation=”fadeIn” css=”.vc_custom_1493357982272{margin: 0px !important;border-width: 0px !important;padding: 0px !important;}”][vc_column][vc_empty_space][\/vc_column][\/vc_row][vc_row css_animation=”none” bg_type=”image” parallax_style=”vcpb-default” bg_image_new=”id^6497|url^https:\/\/iraniancongress.com\/nic\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/07\/logo-back.png|caption^null|alt^null|title^null|description^null” bg_image_repeat=”no-repeat” bg_image_size=”initial” bg_img_attach=”fixed”][vc_column][vc_column_text css_animation=”none”]Iran: Politics, Human Rights, and U.S. Policy<\/strong><\/p>\n

Kenneth Katzman<\/strong><\/p>\n

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs<\/p>\n

February 8, 2018<\/p>\n

Congressional Research Service<\/strong><\/p>\n

7-5700<\/p>\n

www.crs.gov<\/p>\n

RL32048<\/p>\n

Summary<\/strong><\/p>\n

Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the United States and Iran have been broadly at odds. During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran\u2019s support for militant Middle East groups as the primary threat posed by Iran to U.S. interests and allies. Iran\u2019s nuclear program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as the potential for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon increased. Beginning in 2010, the United States orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program\u2014pressure that contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran and the eventual negotiation of a \u201cJoint Comprehensive Plan of Action\u201d (JCPOA). The JCPOA, which took effect in January 2016, exchanged broad sanctions relief for temporary limits on Iran\u2019s nuclear program. The JCPOA reduced the potential threat from Iran\u2019s nuclear program, but did not address the full range of threats posed by Iran, including from its ballistic missile program; its regional influence and support for armed factions; its conventional military programs; and its human rights abuses.<\/p>\n

Some experts and U.S. officials have asserted that the threat posed by Iran stems from the nature and ideology of Iran\u2019s regime. Whereas hardliners continue to control the state institutions that are responsible for Iran\u2019s policies, public support for moderate and reformist figures that seek to promote free expression and international engagement appears strong. One moderate, Hassan Rouhani, has demonstrated this support by winning clear victories in two successive presidential elections, in June 2013 and again on May 19, 2017. In the May 2017 vote, reformist and moderate candidates won overwhelmingly in concurrent municipal council elections in all the major cities, including Tehran. Still, the political successes of moderate candidates have not eliminated deep grievances in Iranian society, as demonstrated by significant unrest that erupted all over Iran during late December 2017-January 2018, and which has continued to simmer in the form of women protesting against enforcement of the strict dress code.<\/p>\n

On October 13, 2017, President Donald Trump articulated a U.S. commitment to countering Iran\u2019s regional influence, curbing its ballistic missile program, and addressing the nuclear-related deficiencies of the JCPOA. Administration officials have not articulated an intent to improve relations with the existing regime in Iran, and have instead expressed hope that the Iranian public and their protests might be able to achieve significant political change. As have successive Administrations, the Trump Administration is continuing efforts to promote civil society in Iran, perhaps in the hopes of stimulating significant opposition to the regime.<\/p>\n

See also CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement<\/em>, by Kenneth Katzman and Paul K. Kerr; CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions<\/em>, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R44017, Iran\u2019s<\/em> Foreign and Defense Policies<\/em>, by Kenneth Katzman.<\/p>\n

Contents<\/strong><\/p>\n

Political History ……………… 1<\/p>\n

Regime Structure, Stability, and Opposition\u00a0……………… \u00a02<\/p>\n

Unelected or Indirectly Elected Institutions: The Supreme Leader, Council of<\/strong><\/p>\n

Guardians, and Expediency Council\u00a0……………… 4<\/p>\n

The Supreme Leader\u00a0……………… 4<\/p>\n

Council of Guardians and Expediency Council\u00a0……………… 5<\/p>\n

Domestic Security Organs\u00a0……………… 6<\/p>\n

Elected Institutions\/Recent Elections ……………… 7<\/p>\n

The Presidency ……………… 7<\/p>\n

The Majles ……………… 8<\/p>\n

The Assembly of Experts ……………… 8<\/p>\n

Recent Elections ……………… 8<\/p>\n

Human Rights Practices ……………… 16<\/p>\n

U.S.-Iran Relations and U.S. Policy ……………… 18<\/p>\n

U.S.-Iran Relations since the Hostage Crisis ……………… 19<\/p>\n

Obama Administration: Pressure, Engagement, and the JCPOA ……………… 20<\/p>\n

Trump Administration Policy ……………… 23<\/p>\n

President Trump Iran Policy Statement of October 13, 2017 ……………… 24<\/p>\n

Military Options ……………… 27<\/p>\n

Economic Sanctions ……………… 28<\/p>\n

Regime Change Option ……………… 29<\/p>\n

Democracy Promotion and Internet Freedom Efforts ……………… 31<\/p>\n

Figures<\/strong><\/p>\n

Figure 1. Structure of the Iranian Government ……………… 37<\/p>\n

Figure 2. Map of Iran ……………… 38<\/p>\n

Tables<\/strong><\/p>\n

Table 1. Other Major Institutions, Factions and Individuals ……………… 6<\/p>\n

Table 2. Human Rights Practices: General Categories ……………… 18<\/p>\n

Table 3. Summary of U.S. Sanctions Against Iran ……………… 29<\/p>\n

Table 4. Iran Democracy Promotion Funding ……………… 34<\/p>\n

Contacts<\/strong><\/p>\n

Author Contact Information ……………… 39<\/p>\n

Acknowledgments ……………… 39<\/p>\n

Political History<\/strong><\/p>\n

Iran is a country of nearly 80 million people, located in the heart of the Persian Gulf region. The United States was an ally of the late Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (\u201cthe Shah\u201d), who ruled from 1941 until his ouster in February 1979. The Shah assumed the throne when Britain and Russia forced his father, Reza Shah Pahlavi (Reza Shah), from power because of his perceived alignment with Germany in World War II. Reza Shah had assumed power in 1921 when, as an officer in Iran\u2019s only military force, the Cossack Brigade (reflecting Russian influence in Iran in the early 20th<\/sup> century), he launched a coup against the government of the Qajar royal family, which had ruled since 1794. Reza Shah was proclaimed Shah in 1925, founding the Pahlavi dynasty. The Qajar dynasty had been in decline for many years before Reza Shah\u2019s takeover. That dynasty\u2019s perceived manipulation by Britain and Russia had been one of the causes of the 1906 constitutionalist movement, which forced the Qajar dynasty to form Iran\u2019s first Majles (parliament) in August 1906 and promulgate a constitution in December 1906. Prior to the Qajars, what is now Iran was the center of several Persian empires and dynasties whose reach had shrunk steadily over time. After the 16th<\/sup> century, Iranian empires lost control of Bahrain (1521), Baghdad (1638), the Caucasus (1828), western Afghanistan (1857), Baluchistan (1872), and what is now Turkmenistan (1894). Iran adopted Shiite Islam under the Safavid Dynasty (1500-1722), which ended a series of Turkic and Mongol conquests.<\/p>\n

The Shah was anti-Communist, and the United States viewed his government as a bulwark against the expansion of Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf and a counterweight to pro-Soviet Arab regimes and movements. Israel maintained a representative office in Iran during the Shah\u2019s time and the Shah supported a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. In 1951, under pressure from nationalists in the Majles<\/em> (parliament) who gained strength in the 1949 Majles elections, he appointed a popular nationalist parliamentarian, Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq, as prime minister. Mossadeq was widely considered left-leaning, and the United States was wary of his drive for nationalization of the oil industry, which had been controlled since 1913 by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. His followers began an uprising in August 1953 when the Shah tried to dismiss him, and the Shah fled. The Shah was restored to power in a CIA-supported uprising that toppled Mossadeq (\u201cOperation Ajax\u201d) on August 19, 1953.<\/p>\n

The Shah tried to modernize Iran and orient it toward the West, but in so doing he alienated the Shiite clergy and religious Iranians. He incurred broader resentment by using his SAVAK intelligence service to repress dissent. The Shah exiled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1964 because of Khomeini\u2019s active opposition to what he asserted were the Shah\u2019s anticlerical policies and forfeiture of Iran\u2019s sovereignty to the United States. Khomeini fled to and taught in Najaf, Iraq, a major Shiite theological center. In 1978, three years after the March 6, 1975, Algiers Accords between the Shah and Iraq\u2019s Baathist leaders that temporarily ended mutual hostile actions, Iraq expelled Khomeini to France, where he continued to agitate for revolution that would establish Islamic government in Iran. Mass demonstrations and guerrilla activity by pro-Khomeini forces caused the Shah\u2019s government to collapse. Khomeini returned from France on February 1, 1979, and, on February 11, 1979, he declared an Islamic Republic of Iran. Khomeini\u2019s concept of velayat-e-faqih<\/em> (rule by a supreme Islamic jurisprudent, or \u201cSupreme Leader\u201d) was enshrined in the constitution that was adopted in a public referendum in December 1979 (and amended in 1989). The constitution provided for the post of Supreme Leader of the Revolution. The regime based itself on strong opposition to Western influence, and relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic turned openly hostile after the November 4, 1979, seizure of the U.S. Embassy and its U.S. diplomats by pro-Khomeini radicals, which began<\/p>\n

1<\/p>\n

the so-called hostage crisis that ended in January 1981 with the release of the hostages.1<\/sup> Ayatollah Khomeini died on June 3, 1989, and was succeeded as Supreme Leader by Ayatollah Ali Khamene\u2019i.<\/p>\n

The regime faced serious unrest in its first few years, including a June 1981 bombing at the headquarters of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) and the prime minister\u2019s office that killed several senior elected and clerical leaders, including then Prime Minister Javad Bahonar, elected President Ali Raja\u2019i, and IRP head and top Khomeini disciple Ayatollah Mohammad Hussein Beheshti. The regime used these events, along with the hostage crisis with the United States, to justify purging many of the secular, liberal, and left-wing personalities that had been prominent in the years just after the revolution. Examples included the regime\u2019s first Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan; the pro-Moscow Tudeh Party (Communist); the People\u2019s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI, see below); and the first elected president, Abolhassan Bani Sadr. The regime was under economic and military threat during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, which at times nearly halted Iran\u2019s oil exports. Since that war, Iran has not faced severe external military threats but domestic political rifts have continued.<\/p>\n

Regime Structure, Stability, and Opposition<\/strong><\/p>\n

Some experts attribute the acrimony that has characterized U.S.-Iran relations since the Islamic revolution to the structure of Iran\u2019s regime. Although it provides for elected institutions, checks and balances, and diversity of opinion, Iran\u2019s constitution reserves paramount decisionmaking authority for Iran\u2019s Shiite clergy by investing vast powers in the position of \u201cSupreme Leader\u201d (known formally in Iran as \u201cLeader of the Revolution\u201d). The Supreme Leader, who is required to be a senior cleric and is not term-limited, is chosen by an all-elected body called the Assembly of Experts. The President and the Majles<\/em> (unicameral parliament) are directly elected, and since 2013, there have been elections for municipal councils that set local development priorities and select mayors. Even within the unelected institutions, factional disputes between those who insist on ideological purity and those considered more pragmatic are evident. In part because of the preponderant political power of the clerics and the security services, the regime has faced repeated periods of unrest from minorities, intellectuals, students, labor groups, the poor, women, and members of Iran\u2019s minority groups. (Iran\u2019s demographics are depicted in a text box below.)<\/p>\n